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Ian R. Kerr* Pre-Natal Fictions and Post-
Partum Actions
The author examines the theory of liability for pre-natal injuries adopted by
Canadian courts. This theory has recently been adopted by the New Brunswick
Court of Appeal in an unprecedented decision that allows an infant to sue its own
mother for alleged negligent conduct that occurred prior to the child's birth. The
author argues that, despite contrary claims, the present theory of liability relies
on the judicial use of a legal fiction. He maintains that this fiction has been
stretched beyond its theoretical limits and concludes that courts are no longer
justified in adopting the present theory of liability in cases where a child sues its
own mother. He ends by suggesting that courts must undertake a deeper
analysis of the issues relevant to a determination of the properscope of recovery
for pre-natal injuries.
L'auteur examine la th6orie de la responsabilit6 pour des blessures pr6natales
retenue par les cours canadiennes. Cette th6orie a r6cemment t6 retenue par
la Cour d'appel au Nouveau-Brunswick dans une d6cision sans pr6cedent qui
permet.a un enfant de poursuivre sa mere en justice pourune conduite all6gu6e
n6gligente qui a eu lieu avant la naissance du b6b6. L'auteur argumente que
malgr6 des revendications contraires, la th6orie actuelle de responsabilit6
invoque l'utilisation judiciaire de la fiction legale. II maintient que cette fiction a
6t6 6tendue au-dela de ses limites theoriques et conclut que les cours ne sont
plus justifiees en retenant la th6orie actuelle de la responsabilit6 dans les
causes o& un enfantpoursuit sa mare en justice. II termine en sugg6rantque les
cours se chargent de faire une plus profonde analyse de ces questions ayant
rapport a une r~solution de la port6e de la guerison convenable pour des
blessures pr6natales.
Introduction
On 9 December 1996, a motion was brought before the New Brunswick
Court of Queen's Bench, Trial Division, in order to determine whether
an infant plaintiff has the legal capacity to commence an action against
its mother for injuries sustained during pregnancy.' According to the
* Faculty of Law and the Faculty of Communications and Open Learning, The University of
Western Ontario, London, Ontario. I would like to convey my gratitude to Vaughan Black,
Richard Bronaugh, David Conter, G.H.L. Fridman, Dennis Klimchuk and Robert Solomon
for their provocative and insightful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
1. Dobson (Litigation Guardian of) v. Dobson (1997), 143 DL.R. (4th) 189 (N.B.Q.B)
[hereinafter Dobson].
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facts alleged by his litigation guardian, Ryan Leigh MacLean Dobson
was born with permanent mental and physical impairment after his
mother Cynthia Dobson negligently crashed her car while pregnant with
Ryan. On 20 January 1997, Miller J. rendered a decision that was the first
of its kind in a Canadian court, allowing the infant plaintiff to sue his own
mother for pre-natal injuries suffered as a result of her alleged negligence.
This unprecedented decision is controversial in many respects. On the
level of public policy, it raises a number of serious concerns for women
about their right to control their own bodies and to make fundamental
decisions about how to live. It is also contentious on the level of theory:
the decision raises difficult questions about the nature and extent of foetal
rights.
Miller J. acknowledged both of these difficulties. With respect to the
public policy issues, Miller J. admitted that
[t]he implications of approving of unborn child-mother litigation are
manifold. While the negligent operation of a motor vehicle may be
uncomplicated insofar as liability is concerned, many other problems
could arise as the result of other allegations of negligence by a mother
towards the foetus.
Can a child at birth sue its mother because she used narcotics or drank
alcoholic beverages? Did the mother over-exercise and cause foetal
damage? Did the mother follow an unsafe diet program?2
Miller J. also recognized "the difficulty of reconciling competing legal
principles"3 with respect to theoretical questions about the nature and
extent of foetal rights. "In one respect, the answer appears to be clear-
a foetus is not a person."4 However, Miller J. went on to consider a body
of established Canadian cases where the Courts have been willing to
recognize "the juridical personality of a foetus as a fiction which is
utilized in order to protect the future interest of the foetus."5 After an
extremely brief analysis of only two of those cases,6 Miller J. quickly
concluded with the following argument:
[I]f an action can be sustained by a child against a parent, and if an action
can be sustained against a stranger for injuries suffered by a child before
2. Ibid. at 190.
3. Ibid. at 192.
4. Ibid. at 190.
5. Ibid. at 191.
6. Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, [1933] S.C.R. 456, [1933] 4 D.L.R. 337; Duval v. Seguin,
[1972] 2 O.R. 686; 26 D.L.R. (3d) 418 (Ont. H.C.).
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birth, then it seems to me a reasonable progression to allow an action by
a child against his mother for pre-natal injuries caused by her negligence.7
This conclusion was, however, punctuated with an important caveat.
Miller J. explicitly recognized that "[t]his is a question with obvious
expanding implications and is one which must ultimately be determined
by a higher court of the judicial structure."8
Not surprisingly, a notice of appeal was filed in the New Brunswick
Court of Appeal forthwith. The appeal was heard on 16 May 1997 and a
decision was dispatched within twelve days.9A unanimous three member
panel of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal 10 affirmed the reasoning
adopted by Miller J. and dismissed Cynthia Dobson's appeal.
Given the potential political implications for women flowing from
these two decisions, the so-called "reasonable progression" that is said to
allow a child born with injuries to sue his or her own mother requires
careful scrutiny. Public policy arguments aside," I maintain that there are
serious theoretical problems inherent in the reasoning that is adopted in
both Dobson decisions and in the earlier cases upon which both Dobson
decisions rely. The aim of this paper is to expose those theoretical
problems so that a still higher court, if ultimately called upon to resolve
this enormously complex problem, is fully aware of the fictitious reason-
ing upon which the present theory of liability for pre-natal injuries
depends.
I begin by considering the historical use of the legal fiction that treats
the child en ventre sa mere as though already born. An examination of its
earliest use in the law of property reveals that the fiction was originally
employed not to ensure or protect foetal rights or interests but merely to
realize a testator's intention to transfer property. In fact, we see that the
notion of foetal "future interests" only became prevalent after the
property fiction achieved a general application via the doctrine of stare
decisis. It was not until much later that the Supreme Court of Canada co-
opted the property fiction into the law of tort so that a child born with pre-
natal injuries was able to recover damages. I shall argue that there was no
sound theoretical basis in the law of tort for adopting the property law
fiction. Recognizing this to be the case as well, other courts since have
attempted to avoid an explicit use of the property fiction, opting instead
for a more elegant approach based on the tort law concept of the
7. Dobson, supra note 1 at 192 [emphasis added].
8. Ibid.
9. Dobson (Litigation Guardian of) v. Dobson, [1997] N.B.J. No. 232 (QL) (N.B.C.A.).
10. The members of the panel were Hoyt C.J.N.B., Ayles J.A., and Turnbull J.A.
11. None were considered by the New Brunswick Court of Queen's Bench or the New
Brunswick Court of Appeal.
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"foreseeable plaintiff'. Although this latter approach has generally been
accepted, I argue that it is no better able to avoid reasoning through the
use of a legal fiction than its predecessor, though use of the fiction under
this approach is implicit. I then attempt to demonstrate the problems
inherent in an implicit use of the legal fiction. Finally, once the theoretical
problems surrounding the use of legal fictions have been exposed, I return
to Dobson to critically examine the reasoning adopted by the Court of
Queen's Bench and by the Court of Appeal. I argue that the courts'
uncritical adoption of the property fiction results in confusion and error.
Not only is the ultimate conclusion reached by both courts insupportable
on the very theory that each adopts, the reasoning in both Dobson
decisions-because its basis is purely theoretical-fails to address a
number of crucial non-theoretical issues.
I. Legal Fictions
Sometimes the bare application of an established common law or statu-
tory rule leads to a result that appears unjust. Judges confronted with such
cases often feel compelled to make a difficult choice. Should the court
follow the established rule or should it disregard the rule in favour of an
outcome that is thought to bejust? One way out of the dilemma, according
to some, is accomplished by the legal fiction.1
2
Generally, a legal fiction is a false assumption of fact made by a court
as the basis for resolving a legal issue. One of its purposes, as Fuller
astutely pointed Out, 13 is to reconcile a specific legal result with an
established rule of law. If no such rule precludes the desired result, there
is no need for a legal fiction; likewise if no particular result is desired. The
legal fiction, it is said, provides a mechanism for preserving the estab-
lished rule while ensuring ajust outcome. Instead of ignoring or altering
the rule that would have precluded thejust result, thejudge openly revises
12. See O.R. Mitchell, "The Fictions of Law: Have They Proved Useful or Detrimental to its
Growth?" (1893) 7 Harv. L. Rev. 477; J. Smith, "Surviving Fictions" (1917) 27 Yale L.J. 147;
M. Cohen, "On the Logic of Fictions" (1923) 20 J. Phil. 477; P. Olivier, Legal Fictions In
Practice and in Legal Science (Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1979); R.A. Samek,
"Fictions and the Law" (1981) 31 U. Toronto L.J. 290; J. Stoneking, "Penumbras and Privacy:
A Study of the use of Fictions In Constitutional Decision-Making" (1985) W. Va. L. Rev. 859;
P. Birks, "Fictions Ancient and Modem" in P. Birks & N. MacCormick, eds., The Legal Mind:
Essaysfor Tony Honorg (New York: Clarendon, 1986); A. Soifer, "Reviewing Legal Fictions"
(1986) 20 Ga. L. Rev. 871; K.S. Hamilton, "Prolegomenon to Myth and Fiction in Legal
Reasoning, Common Law Adjudication and Critical Legal Studies" (1989) 35 Wayne L. Rev.
1449; L. Harmon, "Falling Off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of Substituted
Judgment" (1990) 100 Yale L. Rev. 1.
13. L. Fuller, Legal Fictions (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967) at 51-53.
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the facts of the case. By fictionalizing the facts, the desired result is said
to be reconciled with the established rule while, at the same time, leaving
the established rule intact.
Thus the legal fiction is ajudicial device. It is perhaps best understood
as a practice that some judges invoke on occasions where it is perceived
that the scope of an existing legal rule falls short of what is required in
order to achieve ajust outcome. In Roman law, for example, the function
of the legal fiction was to allow actions otherwise unavailable on a strict
interpretation of the Roman civil code. As a result of the court's deliberate
assumption of a false state of affairs (via a formula that was prescribed by
the praetor), persons previously excluded from its operation were brought
within the ambit of the Roman civil code. To take a typical example,
actions pursuant to the ius civile were not originally available to or against
foreigners. However, as the Romans began to interact commercially with
citizens of other city-states, there were times when justice seemed
impossible without the device of the legal fiction. Since the ius civile
applied only to Roman citizens, the courts had to pretend that certain
foreigners were citizens for the purpose of litigation. By treating certain
foreigners as though they were citizens, the Roman courts allowed the
rigours of the ius civile to remain intact while, at the same time, allowing
it to keep pace with the swift and steady progress of contemporary life.
14
Similar strategies have been employed throughout the history of the
common law.'5 Another typical example is the fiction of "inviting"
employed in the "allurement" cases in the law of tort. 16 According to the
common law, landowners owed a duty of care only to "invitees", i.e. to
those who were permitted or invited on to their land. In other words, no
duty was owed to trespassers. However, a strict application of the
common law became problematic in a series of cases involving children,
usually living close to industrial districts, who were in the habit of playing
on-site, sometimes on equipment that had been abandoned or left unat-
tended. According to the common law, since the children were neither
permitted nor invited to play there, no duty of care was owed to them by
the landowners.
Notwithstanding the fact that the children were clearly "trespassers"
within the meaning of the common law, a number of courts decided to
14. See, I. Kerr, Legal Fictions (Ph.D. Thesis, The University of Western Ontario, 1995) at
13-3 1; P. Olivier, Legal Fictions in Practice and in Legal Science (Rotterdam: Rotterdam
University Press, 1975) at 5-13.
15. See I. Kerr, "The Historical Debate About Legal Fictions", ibid.
16. See e.g. Bohlen, "The Duty of a Landowner Toward Those Entering His Premises of
Their Own Right"(1921) 69 Pa. L. Rev. 340; J.Smith, "Liability of Landowners to Children
Entering Without Permission" (1898) 11 Harv. L. Rev. 349; L. Fuller, supra note 13 at66-70.
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circumvent the common law in order to find the landowners liable in
negligence for leaving potentially dangerous sites unattended. 7 Given
the allure of the abandoned equipment, etc., the courts decided to treat the
children as though they had been beckoned to the site and, hence, as
though they were "invitees." In so doing, it was held that a duty of care
was owed to those children despite the fact that the landowners had
neither invited nor even permitted the children to play on their land. By
using the fiction of "inviting", the courts were able to bring these cases
within the cover of existing doctrine.
However, the very need to pretend to be true things that are known to
be false demonstrates that the legal fictions employed in all of these
different examples are perhaps less a panacea than they are evidence of
a deeper pathology. The need for legal fictions, as Fuller once put it, is
itself a symptom of the complex relation between theory and fact,
between concept and reality.
When all goes well and the established legal rules encompass neatly the
social life they are intended to regulate, there is little occasion for fictions.
There is also little occasion for philosophizing, for the law then proceeds
with a transparent simplicity suggesting no need for reflective scrutiny.
Only in illness, we are told, does the body reveal its complexity. Only when
legal reasoning falters and reaches out clumsily for help do we recognize
what a complex undertaking the law is. 8
Following Fuller, it is my contention that the need for the legal fiction that
treats the child en ventre sa mere as though already born is itself a
symptom of an extremely complex relationship between theory and fact,
concept and reality. Rather than providing a satisfactory solution to the
theoretical problem that arises when a child born with injuries attempts
to sue his or her own mother, reasoning through the device of fiction
attempts to conceal the complexity underlying the legal issue in order to
circumvent it. By exposing the extent to which the reasoning adopted in
Dobson falters and reaches clumsily for help, my aim is to facilitate a
more thoughtful recognition of the complex undertaking that the law is
in determining the scope of child-mother litigation.
17. For three more recent examples, see Van Oudenhove v. D'A oust (1969), 8 D.L.R. (3d)
145,70 W.W.R. 177 (Alta. S.C.); Marquand v. DeKeyser (1970), 75 W.W.R. 439 (Alta. S.C.);
Daneau v. Trynor Enterprises Ltd. (1972), 24 D.L.R. (3d) 434 (N.S.S.C.).
18. Supra note 13 at viii.
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II. The Child En Ventre sa Mre in the Law of Property
A. Personality Begins at Birth
Selecting the appropriate moment to ascribe personhood to human beings
has proved to be a challenging task. Difficulties have been experienced
not only in law but also in philosophy, theology and science. However,
as the Supreme Court of Canada has quite recently stated,
[t]he Court is not required to enter the philosophical and theological
debates about whether or not the foetus is a person, but, rather, to answer
the legal question of whether [the law] has accorded the foetus personhood.
Metaphysical arguments may be relevant but they are not the primary
focus of inquiry. Nor are scientific arguments about the biological status
of the foetus determinative in our inquiry. The task of properly classifying
a foetus in law and in science are different pursuits. 9
Thus although it may be said in the realms of theology and medicine that
life begins at conception, "the law has selected birth as the point at which
the foetus becomes a person with full and independent rights.""° This
long-standing common law rule is premised on the idea that "[a]n unborn
child has no existence as a human being separate from its mother."
'2'
Although the foetus does not achieve independent legal status until
such time as it is born alive and has an existence physically separate from
that of its mother, the common law has always provided some protection
to the unborn. As early as the thirteenth century, as is clear in Bracton, the
foetus was under the guardianship of the criminal law.2 2 It is important to
note, however, that the protection afforded to the unborn in criminal law
did not in and of itself imply that the unborn enjoyed independent legal
status. This point was epitomized by Coke in his famous discussion of the
law prohibiting murder.
If a woman be quick with child and by a potion or otherwise killeth it in her
womb, or if a man beat her, whereby the child dieth in her body and she is
delivered of a dead child, this is... no murder, but if the child be bom alive
and dieth of the potion, battery, or other cause, this is murder; for in law
it is accounted as a reasonable creature, in rerum natura when it is born
alive. 2
3
19. Tremblay v. Daigle, [19891 2 S.C.R. 530 at 552-53, 62 D.L.R. (4th) 634.
20. Dehler v. Ottawa Civic Hospital (1979), 25 O.R. (2d) 748 at 761, 101 D.L.R. (3d) 686
(Ont. H.C.), aff'd (1980), 29 O.R. (2d) 677, 117 D.L.R. (3d) 512 (Ont. C.A.).
21. See the dicta of Holmes J. in Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. R. 242
(1884).
22. See e.g., Law Reform Commission of Canada, Crimes Against the Foetus (Working
Paper 58) (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission, 1989).
23. Sir E. Coke, The Third Part of the Institute of the Laws of England: Concerning High
Treason, and other Pleas of the Crown, and Criminal Causes, 4th ed. (London: A. Crooke,
1669) at 50.
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According to Coke one cannot murder a child en ventre sa mere. This
is because the common law requires the child to be born alive before it can
be considered a "reasonable creature" or, in modern parlance, a legal
person. Once born, the child achieves the legal status of person and is
thereby attributed certain legal rights and remedies otherwise unavail-
able. At any point prior to birth, however, the child is not a person and is
not independently entitled to such legal rights or remedies.
This rule has been reaffirmed on numerous occasions in Canada in
both the criminal and civil context. For example, the Supreme Court of
Canada recently determined that a botched delivery attempt by two
negligent midwives, during which an unborn child's heart ceased to
function while trapped in its mother's birth canal, could not result in a
conviction for criminal negligence causing death to another person.24 The
Court held that there could be no such conviction because the line of
demarcation between a foetus and a person at common law inevitably
leads to the conclusion that a child in the birth canal is, as a matter of law,
not another person but a part of its mother. Consequently, the Supreme
Court of Canada agreed with the British Columbia Court of Appeal that
the two negligent midwives could only be convicted of criminal negli-
gence causing bodily harm to the mother. This result, though in the
criminal context, is consistent with the rationale underlying the Court's
decision two years earlier in Tremblay v. Daigle.25 In Tremblay v. Daigle
the Supreme Court considered the status of the foetus under the Quebec
Civil Code and in Anglo-Canadian private law and concluded that the
foetus is not in law a person and is therefore not entitled to an interlocutory
injunction preventing the woman carrying it from having an abortion.
B. Fulfilling the Testator's Intentions
The strictness of this common law rule was first encountered by judges
in the law of property. The facts in Thellusson v. Woodford 26illustrate the
hardships suffered under the rule. At the time of the testator's death, the
wife of his son Peter Thellusson was pregnant with twin sons, later born
William and Frederick Thellusson. According to the common law rule,
since the twins were not yet born and therefore not persons at the time of
the devise, they were not entitled to inherit from their grandfather. This
was so despite the fact that the devisor bequeathed to his grandchildren
"as shall be living at the time of my decease or born in due time
24. R. v. Sullivan, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 489, 55 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1.
25. Supra note 19.
26. (1798), 4 Ves. Jun. 227, 31 E.R. 117 (Ch.) [hereinafter cited to E.R.].
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afterwards."7 The court considered a long line of cases to determine
whether the testator had transgressed the boundary of executory devises
by extending the devise to include nonpersons. In deciding that William
and Frederick could inherit, the court followed a number of older cases
including one from the Court of Common Pleas28 which stated as a settled
principle that, for purposes of inheriting, "the child en ventre is to be
considered begotten and born." In Thellusson v. Woodford the court also
relied on "the fiction of Roman Law that considered children in the womb
as living persons" and held that this fiction has been adopted by the
common law "to enable them to take legacies and devises."29 Thus a legal
fiction was employed so that the court could execute Thellusson' s devise
in the manner that he had intended it. With the legal fiction the court was
able to honour his request without altering the rule at common law that
only those who are born are persons.
The scope of this fiction within the law of property was tested in later
cases. Questions ensued when a testator would make specific bequests in
his will to "surviving children" or to "all living children" without a clause
including those "born in due time afterwards." What would happen if the
testator had a posthumous child? In other words, what if the child was en
ventre sa mere at the time of his or her father's death? Would that child
count as a "surviving" or "living" child such that he or she could inherit
once born? On a strict common law analysis the child en ventre sa mere
would not have been a "living" child since, at the relevant time, the child
did not have an existence separate from that of its mother. Consequently,
the child en ventre sa mere could not inherit.
. However, in Trower v. Butts,30 a strict application of the common law
rule was found problematic. The court reasoned that, as long as the donor
had not expressed or implied in the document an intention to confine the
gift to children born at the date at which the gift takes effect, the
posthumous child could inherit. For if the donor had thought about it at
all, he would almost certainly have said that he wished to include his
posthumous children among the beneficiaries. This reasoning was subse-
quently adopted in a number of English cases 3' and by a Canadian court
in Re Charlton Estate,32 where it was held that if the potential existence
27. Ibid. at 159.
28. Whitelock v. Heddon (1798), 1 Bos. & Pul. 243, 126 E.R. 883.
29. Supra note 26 at 140.
30. (1823), 1 Sim. & St. 181,57 E.R. 72 (V.C.).
31. Blasson v. Blasson, (1864) 2 De G.J.& S. 665, 46 E.R. 534 (Ch.); Villar v. Gilbey, [ 1907]
A.C. 139 (H.L.); Elliot v. Joicey, [1935] A.C. 209 (H.L.).
32. [1919] 1 W.W.R. 134 (Man. K.B.).
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of such child placed it plainly within "the reason and motive of such gift",
the court will resort to a legal fiction and construe the will so as to include
the child by finding him alive at the relevant time. It is crucial to note that
the reasons for adopting the legal fiction were not stated in terms of the
rights or interests of the unborn. In each of these cases the issue was
simply whether the donor had likely intended the class of recipients to
include the unborn.
Thus, in the law of property, a legal fiction was sometimes invoked to
alter the facts in particular situations. In order to fulfill the intentions of
a testator, the posthumous child was treated as though in rerum natura at
the time of the will. This is said to allow an unborn child to inherit in spite
of the common law rule to the contrary. Further, use of the fiction is said
to achieve this result without having to relinquish the original common
law rule. By merely fictionalizing the facts in a given case, the rule that
personality begins at birth is said to remain intact. Since it is the facts that
are altered and not the original rule, the desired result is said to have been
reconciled with the common law.33
C. Extending the Perpetuities Period
Since the advent of this legal fiction, its subsequent use has engendered
a lineage of its own. In the law of property it has had the further effect of
extending the lifespan of the common law rule against perpetuities.
Originally the rule against perpetuities limited the subject-matter of the
devise to a period no longer than a life in being plus twenty-one years
thereafter. However, with the continued use of the fiction which treats the
child en ventre sa mere as though it were in rerum natura, the perpetuity
period was eventually extended to include the ordinary period of human
gestation. Instead of determining the perpetuity period by considering
lives already "in being," as the courts had always done in the past, judges
began to consider the child en ventre sa mere as though it were a "life in
being," not only for the purpose of the acquisition of property by the child
itself but also a "life in being" chosen to form part of the perpetuities
period.
3 4
Use of the property law fiction has since been extended to the law of
tort. What began in the law of property as ajudicial device to preserve the
intentions of a testator has since become a mechanism for furnishing the
33. See e.g. Fuller, supra note 13.
34. P.H. Winfield, "The Unborn Child" (1942) 4 U. Toronto L.J. 278 at 279; see also
Perpetuities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P-9, ss. 1, 8(2), 8(3), 8(4).
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unborn with rights and remedies not otherwise available at common law.
Is it legitimate to extend the use of this fiction to other areas of the law?
III. A Theory of Liability for Pre-natal Injuries
A. Co-opting the Property Fiction into the Law of Tort
A separate theoretical consequence of the common law rule that legal
personality begins at birth is that the child en ventre sa mire is unable to
recover damages in tort for injuries suffered prior to birth. While still in
the womb the foetus is not yet a person. Since the scope of tort duties
extends only to persons, no remedy exists at common law for a child born
with injuries sustained during pregnancy.
Eventually the harsh consequences of the application of this rule
within the tort regime resulted in a judicial response similar to that
experienced in the law of property. In order to allow a child born with
injuries to recover damages, the fictitious ascription of personality to the
child en ventre sa mere was extended from property law to the law of tort.
The Supreme Court of Canada seemed to have set the standard for the rest
of the English-speaking world in Montreal Tramways v. Leveille.35 In that
case a child en ventre sa mere subsequently born with club feet was found
to have been injured by the fault of the defendant, who had caused the
woman who would soon become his mother to fall while alighting from
a tram car. The majority of the Court recognized that in 1933 "the great
weight of judicial opinion in the common law courts denies the right of
a child when born to maintain an action for prenatal injuries." 36Neverthe-
less, the majority boldly reversed this by declaring that a child who suffers
injury while in its mother's womb as the result of a wrongful act or default
of another has the right, after birth, to maintain an action for its prenatal
injuries. Lamont J. justified his rejection of the common law in this case
on the basis of the following principle.
If a child after birth has no right of action for prenatal injuries, we have a
wrong inflicted for which there is no remedy.... If a right of action be
denied to the child it will be compelled, without any fault on its part, to go
through life carrying the seal of another's fault and bearing a very heavy
burden of infirmity and inconvenience without any compensation
therefor. 7
35. Supra note 6.
36. Ibid. at 460.
37. Ibid. at 464.
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As a result, the majority took notice of the fact that in the law of property,
the child en ventre sa mere had already been treated as a person and,
likewise, applied the fiction to the case at bar.
Unfortunately, Lamont J. did not proceed further with the analysis.
Once the child en ventre sa mere was deemed to be a person, the Court
held without question that the child could recover damages for its pre-
natal injury. The Court failed to provide a theoretical basis for its
decision. For example, the majority did not reason that the unborn child,
by virtue of its position, was deemed to be a party to the contract between
its mother and the tramway company. Nor did the majority contend that
the unborn child, once deemed to be a person, became a foreseeable
plaintiff who was owed a duty of care by the tramway company. Lamont
J. simply ignored these issues.
The decision in this case not only required an adoption of the property
law fiction but also seemed somehow to transcend the issues usually
considered in tort law analysis. As Lamont J. put it:
To my mind it is but natural justice that a child, if born alive and viable,
should be allowed to maintain an action in the courts for injuries wrong-
fully committed upon its person while in the womb of its mother.38
Other than this rather esoteric appeal to "natural justice" and an odd use
of the notion "its person," no theory was put forward to account for the
decision. In particular, no theory was provided to support the proposition
that the child in the womb is ascribed legal personality. There was no
discussion of how or why the property law fiction was relevant or material
or how the property law fiction could apply as a proper precedent across
such diverse areas of law. It is important to remember that the property
law fiction was originally employed only so that the court could fulfill the
intentions of the testator. It was not originally invoked to protect foetal
rights or future interests. Despite all of these deficiencies in the reasons,
there has been an increasing tendency for Courts in a number of common
law jurisdictions to allow compensation for pre-natal injuries following
the decision in Montreal Tramways v. Leveille.
B. The Unborn Child as a Foreseeable Plaintiff
Donoghue v. Stevenson,39 which was decided one year before Montreal
Tramways v. Leveille, extended the reach of negligence actions in this
38. Ibid. [emphasis added].
39. [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.).
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area further still. The decision in Donoghue v. Stevenson and in a number
of cases since40 have made it clear that it is unnecessary for damages to
coincide in time or place with the wrongful act or default. Further, in a
number of these cases the existence of the particular plaintiff was
unknown to the defendant.
In the leading Canadian case on prenatal injuries 4' Fraser J. said of
these earlier cases that "it would have been immaterial to the causes of
action if the plaintiffs had been persons born after the negligent acts. 42
In Duval v. Seguin a women thirty-one weeks pregnant was involved in
a car accident caused by the negligent actions of another. Three weeks
later her child, Ann Duval, was prematurely born suffering cerebral
defects as a result of the accident. In deciding whether the child had a right
to damages for the pre-natal injury, Fraser J. developed an approach more
precise than the appeal to "natural justice" invoked in Montreal Tram-
ways v. Leveille. By extrapolating from the developing law of negligence,
Fraser J. determined the scope of recovery for pre-natal injuries by citing
the famous dictum of Lord Atkin in Donoghue v. Stevenson.
The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not
injure your neighbour; and the lawyer's question, Who is my neighbour?
receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or
omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your
neighbour. Who, then, in law is my neighbour? The answer seems to be-
persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought
reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am
directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question. 3
Under this doctrine Fraser J. held that an unborn child is within the scope
of foreseeable risk incurred by a negligent third party motorist. He further
held that once the child is born alive with injuries resulting from the
accident, the cause of action is completed.
Following the modem developments in the law of negligence, Fraser
J. awarded damages for pre-natal injuries without expressly employing a
legal fiction. Because Fraser J. held that a child en ventre sa mere is a
foreseeable plaintiff he thought that
it is not necessary in the present case to consider whether the unborn child
was a person in law or at which stage she became a person. For negligence
to be a tort there must be damages. While it was the foetus or child en ventre
40. See especially Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills, [1936] A.C. 85 (P.C.); Dorset Yacht
Co. v. Home Office, [1970] A.C. 1004 (H.L.).
41. Duval v. Seguin, supra note 6.
42. Ibid. at 700.
43. Donoghue v. Stevenson, supra note 39 at 580 (emphasis added); cited ibid. at 699.
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sa mere who was injured, the damages sued for are the damages suffered
by the plaintiff Ann since birth and which she will continue to suffer as a
result of the injury."
According to Fraser J. the common law rule that an unborn child is not a
person has no bearing on the ability to recover for pre-natal injuries
suffered after birth. Because Ann Duval was a foreseeable plaintiff who
was owed a duty of care, once born she was able to bring an action to
recover damages for injuries brought on by the negligence of Mr. Seguin.
This was so notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Seguin's negligent act was
completed long before there ever existed a legal person named Ann
Duval.
In the same year that Duval v. Seguin was decided, the full court of the
Supreme Court of Australia handed down a comparable decision on a
case with remarkably similar facts.45 In Watt v. Rama a pregnant woman
driver had been injured by the faulty driving of the defendant. The woman
driver had subsequently given birth to the plaintiff who suffered from
brain damage, epilepsy and paralysis from the neck downward. Like the
majority in Duval v. Seguin, all three members of the Court in Watt v.
Rama resorted to the basic principles of modern negligence, in particular
to the statement of the "neighbour principle" by Lord Atkin in Donoghue
v. Stevenson. Winneke C.J. and Pape J. held that it was reasonably
foreseeable at the time of the collision that the defendant's conduct might
cause injury to a pregnant woman in the car with which it collided.
Therefore, the Court concluded, the possibility of injury on birth to the
child she was carrying must also be reasonably foreseeable. For Winneke
C.J. and Pape J., this foreseeability gave rise to a potential relationship
capable of imposing a duty on the defendant to the child if, and when, the
child was born alive. On such birth the relationship crystallized, since it
was then that the child suffered injuries as a living person. With the
crystallization of this relationship a retrospective duty of care arose owed
by the defendant to the child.
The third member of the Court, Gillard J., reached the same conclusion
but by quite another means. In a very different application of the
"neighbour principle", Gillard J. held that the plaintiff was already a
member of a class of persons which might reasonably and probably be
affected by the defendant's carelessness.
The unborn child should be included in the class of persons likely to be
affected by [the driver's] carelessness since the regeneration of the human
species implies the presence on the highway of many pregnant women.
46
44. Supra note 6 at 701.
45. Watt v. Rama, [1972] V.R. 353.
46. Ibid. at 374 [emphasis added].
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Unlike the majority, who felt the need to impose a retrospective duty of
care owed by the plaintiff to the defendant, Gillard J. was prepared to
include the unborn child in the category of persons using the highway.
The decisions in Duval v. Seguin and Watt v. Rama have laid the
foundation for the current theory of recovery forpre-natal injuries in spite
of the common law rule that legal personality begins only at birth. As a
result, the courts in most common law jurisdictions no longer find any
difficulty in holding that there is a duty to take reasonable care for the
safety of unborn plaintiffs that stand foreseeably within the scope of the
defendant's risk.
IV. An Analysis of the "Unborn Plaintiff" Approach
Since the twin decisions in Duval v. Seguin and Watt v. Rama, most
common law analysts have been convinced that the fiction ascribing
personality to the unborn used in Montreal Tramways v. Leveille is no
longer required to award damages for prenatal injuries. As one English
writer put it,
[s]ince the tort of negligence is incomplete unless and until damage is
suffered by the plaintiff, that tort is in fact completed on the live birth of
the injured infant, at which time the infant has legal personality and is able
to sue through his next friend, albeit that injuries were inflicted on the
infant while he was in utero. This last approach has the undeniable
attraction of rendering unnecessary any decision as to the legal status of the
unborn child, though it is implicit in it that such child does have a separate
identity from that of its mother.
47
On this view, with the concept of the "foreseeable plaintiff' there is no
longer any need to account for or to fictionalize the legal personality of
the unborn. Thus, as Gordon once described it, there is a shift in emphasis
from the "unborn child" to the "unborn plaintiff."48The result of this shift
is a more elegant analysis. The desired legal result is achieved without
resort to a legal fiction. Or is it?
The decisions in both Duval v. Seguin and Watt v. Rama rely on Lord
Atkin's "neighbour principle." Applying this principle in Duval v.
Seguin, Fraser J. held that "[s]uch a child therefore falls within the area
of potential danger which the driver is required to foresee and take
reasonable care to avoid." 49Applying the principle in Watt v. Rama,
47. P.J. Pace, "Civil Liability For Prenatal Injuries" (1977) 40 Mod. L. Rev. 141 at 142
[emphasis added].
48. D.A. Gordon, "The Unborn Plaintiff Approach" (1965) 63 Mich. L. Rev. 579.
49. Supra note 6 at 701.
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Gillard J. held that "[t]he unborn child should be included in the class of
persons likely to be affected by [the driver's] carelessness."50 Are these
correct applications of Lord Atkin's "neighbour principle"?
It is worthwhile to remember that Lord Atkin, in answer to the question
"who, then, in law is my neighbour?", responded first by saying that the
answer "receives a restricted reply." "1He then went on to say, "The
answer seems to be-persons who are so closely and directly affected by
my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so
affected when I am directing my mind to the acts and omissions which are
called in question."52 Thus for Lord Atkin the notion of a foreseeable
plaintiff is restricted to persons. This limits the scope of a negligence
action to persons. 53 For example, a dog cannot bring an action nor can the
dog's owner bring an action on the dog's behalf since the dog is not a
person and therefore cannot be said to stand within the scope of a risk.
Even if it was foreseeable that the dog would be injured as a result of some
risk, the risk-taker will never be liable to the dog since no duty of care is
owed to dogs.54 Thus, according to Lord Atkin, every negligence action
must have an answer to the question: upon whom was the wrong inflicted?
If it cannot be said that there was some person upon whom a wrong was
inflicted, there is no cause of action in tort.
While it is true that Donoghue v. Stevenson and subsequent cases have
made it clear that it is unnecessary that the damage coincide in time or
place with the wrongful act it does not follow that it is "immaterial to
causes of action if the plaintiffs had been persons born after the negligent
acts. 55 In some cases it may be immaterial. The defendant may owe a duty
of care to some person who will exist in the future. This is so in the
hypothetical case of a manufacturer of baby toys. Assume that in 1997 a
manufacturer negligently produces a defective baby toy that will sit
unsold on a store shelf until 1999. An expectant father comes along and
purchases the toy for his soon-to-be-born child, not knowing it to be
defective. A few months later the child is born. A year after that, on the
boy's first birthday, the father gives him the toy. Shortly after receiving
the defective toy, the child suffers an injury while playing with it. In such
case, it is clear that the child has a cause of action notwithstanding the fact
that he was not alive in 1997 when the manufacturer produced the
50. Supra note 45 at 374.
51. Supra note 43 [emphasis added].
52. Ibid. [emphasis added].
53. Therefore, all plaintiffs must be legal persons. This is precisely why Kings, Queens and
corporations have been ascribed personality.
54. At least, not yet.
55. Fraser J. in Duval v. Seguin, supra note 6 at 700.
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defective toy. What makes the manufacturer liable in negligence is not the
mere fact that a defective toy was produced. The manufacturer is liable
because a person who is within the class of ultimate consumers to whom
a duty of care was owed was injured as a result of the careless manufac-
turing of the defective toy.
However, it does not follow from this example that it is always
immaterial whether the plaintiff was born before or after the occurrence
of the careless act. For instance, the actual time of birth may be more
important in certain types of cases that do not involve a manufacturer's
liability. This is because the scope of a manufacturer's risk is far greater
than the scope of risk incurred by certain other types of risk-takers (such
as careless drivers). The reason that there is a cause of action in the baby
toy case imagined above is precisely because an existing person who
stood within the scope of the manufacturer's risk suffered an injury as a
result. Although the careless act that ultimately made the manufacturer
liable occurred three years before the child was born, the negligence of
the manufacturer caused an injury to a living child who, at the time of
injury, was already a member of the class of persons owed a duty of care
by the manufacturer. But this is so only because a manufacturer is
required to reasonably foresee that the ultimate consumer may not use the
product immediately.
The facts in Duval v. Seguin and Watt v. Rama must be distinguished
from the case of the negligent toy manufacturer, since the children
ultimately seeking damages in these two cases were not yet born at the
time when they were injured. At the time of the collisions each was a
foetus; neither was a person in the eyes of the law. Consequently,
according to the principle as set out in Donoghue v. Stevenson, Gillard J.
was wrong to say that "[t]he unborn child should be included in the class
of persons likely to be affected by [the driver's] carelessness."56 Like-
wise, Fraser J. was equally in error by holding that "[sluch a child
therefore falls within the area of potential danger which the driver is
required to foresee and take reasonable care to avoid."57 On a strict
temporal analysis of the facts, there is no cause of action in either case
because each child en ventre sa mre was not yet a person at the time of
the collision. Although the drivers in these two cases owed a duty of care
to all persons who use the highway, the unborn children were not persons
according to the common law and therefore could not possibly have been
members of the class of persons using the highway.
56. Supra note 46 at 374.
57. Duval v. Seguin, supra note 6 at 701.
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It is incorrect to say that although the unborn child was not yet a person
at the time of the accident, she was a foreseeable plaintiff.58 A plaintiff is
a person who commences an action. The very notion of being a plaintiff-
foreseeable or otherwise-entails being a person. Further, as we have
already seen, only persons are owed a duty of care in tort law. Although
this legal truism was clearly stated by Lord Atkin, who restricted the duty
of care to "persons closely and directly affected", somehow his restric-
tion was overlooked in both Duval v. Seguin and Watt v. Rama. Because
in each case the tortious act was completed prior to birth, neither child was
a person at the time of the alleged wrongdoing. Each therefore lacked the
standing necessary to commence an action. In other words, both children
were incapable of being plaintiffs at that time. Consequently, neither
could possibly be said to belong to the subcategory of plaintiffs known as
"foreseeable plaintiffs" at the time of the collision.
A foreseeable plaintiff is a person to whom a duty of care is owed; such
a person is one who has a cause of action if that duty is breached. In
deciding whether there exists a foreseeable plaintiff one must ask: does
there exist some person who might reasonably be anticipated to suffer an
injury as a result of my risk? Of course, if no person is closely and directly
affected by my careless conduct, there can be no cause of action. Because
of the common law rule that personality begins at birth, a strict temporal
analysis of the facts in Duval v. Seguin and in Watt v. Rama logically
compels the trier of fact to conclude that the person who commenced the
action sometime after being born was, strictly speaking, not at the
accident scene. The issue then becomes whether there is some way in
which the newborn plaintiff can now sue for something that happened in
the past, though in theory not to that person.
The error in the analysis in Duval v. Seguin and in Watt v. Rama is that
both courts mistook the notion of a "foreseeable plaintiff' with that of a
potential plaintiff. Consequently, the status of "person" was attributed in
both cases to an entity that was not in law a person, though each entity
certainly had the potential to become a person. Both courts were correct
in stating that it is reasonably foreseeable that pregnant women will give
birth.5 9But the foreseeability of the event of birth no more makes the child
en ventre sa mire a foreseeable plaintiff than it makes it a newborn infant.
A potentially newborn infant is not newly born. Likewise, a potentially
foreseeable plaintiff is not a foreseeable plaintiff. Thus although it is
58. Although she isforeseeably a plaintiff. See the discussion of potential plaintiffs below.
59. And that pregnant women drive on highways, and that injured pregnant women will
sometimes give birth to injured children, etc.
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foreseeable that an unborn child might become a foreseeable plaintiff, it
does not follow that it is one.
This makes the analysis in Duval v. Seguin and in Watt v. Rama
problematic. The difficulty is illustrated in Watt v. Rama when Winneke
C.J. said that the events
constituted a potential relationship capable of imposing a duty on the
defendant in relation to the child if and when bom. On birth the relationship
crystallized and out of it arose a duty on the defendant in relation to the
child.60
Winneke C.J. held that the potential relationship crystallized upon the
birth of the child, since it was then that the child first suffered injuries as
a person. With the crystallization of this relationship a retrospective duty
of care arose owed by the defendant to the child. Since it was held that this
duty was breached, the defendant was liable for damages to the newborn.
These reasons for judgment are extremely difficult to grasp. How is a
"potential relationship" capable of imposing a past duty? The concept of
potentiality lends nothing to the analysis. To say that there existed only
a potential relationship at the time of the accident is precisely to mean that
there was no actual relationship at the time of the accident. The allegation
that Rama was in a "potential relationship" at the time of the accident
leaves available to him a perfect line of defence: since the relationship
was only a "potential relationship" there was no actual relationship at the
time of the accident. "Therefore," Rama would submit, "I owed no duty
of care other than to the mother at the time of the accident." Alternatively,
if it were alleged that Rama was in an actual relationship that crystallized
with the birth of a child who is now suffering an injury from some
previous event, Rama would still have had a perfect defence. Rama would
agree that he now has a relationship with the child and that he owes a duty
to take reasonable care not to injure this newly born infant. But since he
has not acted carelessly toward or injured the infant since her birth, he has
not breached his duty of care.
Winneke C.J. was correct in stating that a relationship crystallized at
birth. However, he failed to explain how it is that this newly-formed
relationship can legitimately be applied ex post facto to prior events
where it is admitted that no duty was owed. Winneke C.J. is horned by the
following dilemma. If he refuses to employ the fiction used in Montreal
Tramways v. Leveille, pretending that the unborn child was a person at the
time of the accident, his decision forces him to utilize a different kind of
fiction. He must pretend that there was a breach of duty at the time of the
accident when really there was none. Either way, Winneke C.J. is forced
60. Supra note 45 at 360.
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to employ an implicit retrospective fiction in order to find for the injured
child.
If this assessment of the reasons for judgment in Watt v. Rama is
correct, it would seem that commentators like Pace are incorrect in
thinking that the "unborn plaintiff' analysis "has the undeniable attrac-
tion of rendering unnecessary any decision as to the legal status of the
unborn child."'6' Without conferring legal status upon the unborn child in
one way or another, there is no plaintiff with standing to bring an action.
Thus the only way the "unborn plaintiff' analysis really works is to
presume, as Gillard J. did in Wattv. Rama, that "[t]he unborn child should
be included in the class of persons likely to be affected by [the driver's]
carelessness. '6 At its best, this too is an implied use of the legal fiction
ascribing personality to the unborn child. Although there is no mention
that a fiction is being utilized, the analysis cannot proceed without it.
Without implicitly treating the child en ventre sa mere as though it were
a person, it will not fit into the class of persons protected by the
"neighbour principle." A tacit use of the fiction is also evident in the
rhetorical words of Fraser J. in Duval v. Seguin:
Ann's mother was plainly one of a class within the area of foreseeable risk
and one to whom the defendants therefore owed a duty. Was Ann any less
so? I think not.
63
Upon reading those words one is tempted to ask: "One of a class of what?
Persons?" Thus in both Duval v. Seguin and Watt v. Rama the "unborn
plaintiff' analysis only works alongside an unwritten treatment of the
child en ventre sa more as though it were a child in rerum natura. Though
its use is unspoken, a legal fiction is still required to award damages for
prenatal injuries. This is not at all surprising, given the existence of the
rule at common law that personality begins at birth.
V. A Model for Understanding the Use of the Fiction
A. The Deductive Argument
One way to understand how the legal fiction has been utilized in these
cases is to compare the traditional model of legal reasoning to the
deductive argument in logic. An argument consists of a set of premises
that are put forth in support of a further proposition, called the conclusion.
61. Supra note 47. In fact, as will become clear in the course of the analysis to follow, the error
is foreshadowed by the language in the second half of Pace's claim, cited ibid., wherein Pace
admits that "it is implicit that such a child does not have a separate identity from that of its
mother."
62. Supra note 46 at 374.
63. Supra note 6 at 701.
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In one type of argument, known as a syllogism, the argument is composed
of three propositions: a major premise, a minor premise and a conclusion.
For example:
Major Premise: Only persons alive at the time of the devise are entitled to
inherit.
Minor Premise: Frederick Thellusson was not a person alive at the time of
the devise.
Conclusion: Frederick Thellusson is not entitled to inherit.
With this example one can think of the legal rule as the major premise, the
fact situation in a particular case as the minor premise, and the judicial
decision as the conclusion. The traditional model of legal reasoning
involves applying the facts of a particular dispute to the relevant legal rule
in order to reach a decision. In syllogistic terms this means applying the
minor premise to the major premise in order to come to some conclusion.
B. Applying the Model to the Property Fiction
Using this model of reasoning, one can isolate the stage of the analysis at
which the legal fiction comes into play. The explicit use of the fiction in
the early property law cases applied the fiction directly to the minor
premise. The strategy in Thellusson v. Woodford,6 for example, was to
treat Frederick Thellusson as though he was a person alive at the time of
the devise despite the established fact that he was not yet born. If it could
be pretended that he was, the minor premise would transpose the
conclusion to its logical opposite in the following way:
Major Premise: Only persons born at the time of the devise are entitled to
inherit.
Minor Premise: Frederick Thellusson "was" a person born at the time of the
devise.
Conclusion: Frederick Thellusson is entitled to inherit.
This model would allow Frederick Thellusson to inherit just as his
grandfather had wished. The reason for transposing the facts in the minor
premise is to allow for this wish while at the same time keeping the major
premise intact. Generally speaking, the Court accepted the common law
rule that only persons are entitled to inherit and did not wish to implement
a new rule to the contrary. Instead the Court pretended that Frederick
Thellusson was a person at that time for the in order to achieve the
intended result without having to sacrifice the original rule.
64. Supra note 26.
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C. Applying the Model to the Tort Fiction
The same model of reasoning can also be used to examine more recent tort
decisions such as Duval v. Seguin.65 Here one begins to see that the fiction
is applied somewhat differently. As the above analysis demonstrated, the
fiction is no longer restricted to the minor premise but is ultimately
applied to the majorpremise of the syllogism. Before applying the fiction,
the original syllogism would have been as follows:
Major Premise: Only persons are owed a duty of care.
Minor Premise: Ann Duval was not a person (but was a potential person).
Conclusion: Ann Duval was not owed a duty of care.
Rather than applying a fiction to the minor premise and pretending that
Ann Duval was a person, thus transposing the conclusion to its logical
opposite, Fraser J. fictitiously broadened the scope of the rule so as to
include the unborn. In other words, it was the major premise that was
amended. The reasoning was as follows:
Major Premise: Persons and "potential persons" are owed a duty of care.
Minor Premise: Ann Duval was a potential person.
Conclusion: Ann Duval was owed a duty of care.
This model allows Ann Duval, once born, to recover damages. But notice
that it does so at the expense of altering the major premise. The rule no
longer restricts the duty of care to persons. With this application of the
fiction, the common law rule is substantially altered.
D. Stare Decisis, Rule Erosion and an Implicit Use of the Fiction
The above analysis reveals a serious danger when one considers the effect
of repeated uses of a legal fiction. When a fiction is repeatedly employed
and the Court alters the facts in a series of cases, it soon begins to look as
though the fiction itself acquires a more general application. Ironically,
as the fiction acquires a general application via the doctrine of stare
decisis, it has the ultimate effect of eroding the original rule that the judge
who first employed the fiction had meant to preserve. As the common law
rule deteriorates, the traditional method of legal reasoning becomes
inverted. While the correct method of legal reasoning involves the
application of a particular set of facts to the relevant legal rule, it is now
the fiction and not the facts that is applied to the rule. The result is that the
fiction is no longer applied overtly to the facts of the case but, instead, the
65. Supra note 6.
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fiction becomes tacitly built into the legal rule. Once this occurs the
common law has become substantially altered.
Rule erosion resulting from multiple uses of a legal fiction is illustrated
by the fiction that treats the child en ventre sa mere as if it were born.
While it was originally utilized in the law of property to preserve both the
rule that personality begins at birth and the particular intentions of a
testator, it was later adopted and applied in the law of tort. The fiction was
borrowed by the courts without any attempt to justify its use. For
example, how is the property law fiction relevant to the tort analysis?
Having been used in so many property cases, the Supreme Court of
Canada simply stated that the fiction of the civil law "must be held to be
of general application."66 Further, Lamont J. found support for the use of
the fiction in the fact that "none of the judges below cast any doubt upon
the right of the respondent to sue."67 This is not the least bit surprising.
Because the fiction had been successfully employed in so many previous
cases, the legal determination that an unborn child is not a person in law
becomes blurred. Interestingly, the potential for misuse of this fiction was
recognized in sole dissent of Smith J. in Montreal Tramways v. Leveille,
who submitted that the fiction has a narrow scope that is restricted to the
law of property.68 For this reason Smith J. was of the view, contrary to the
majority, that the fiction could not be given general application.
Perhaps even more dangerous than an explicit application of the fiction
is its implicit use. In tort law an implicit use of the fiction ascribing
personality to the child en ventre sa mere likely originated in one of two
ways. The courts might have abandoned the explicit use of the fiction
after having heard the dissent in Montreal Tramways v. Leveille. More
likely, however, the implicit use of the fiction was simply the result of an
erosion of the common law rule after a repeated explicit use of the fiction.
Either way, the courts soon began to favour the "unborn plaintiff'
approach. This approach does not merely erode the common law rule. It
actually rewrites the rule. By calling the child en ventre sa mere an
"unborn plaintiff', the common law rule has been completely recast.
With the "unborn plaintiff' approach, the courts are not simply saying
that in particular cases we treat the unborn child as if it were born, but
rather, that legal personality no longer begins at birth. Such orchestrations
fly in the face of the rule of law and are contrary to the proper scope of
the original fiction in the law of property, which was used to achieve a
particular result without altering the common law rule.
66. Montreal Tramways, supra note 6 at 465.
67. Ibid. at 465-66.
68. Ibid.at481.
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V. The Expanding Use of the Fiction
A. Preconception Torts
As judges continue to use the legal fiction ascribing personality to the
unborn child, they continue to widen the scope of legal personality. This
is already happening in the law of tort. The implicit use of the fiction in
Duval v. Seguin widened the class of entities that can recover in tort. It is
no longer merely foetuses that are protected by the "unborn plaintiff'
analysis. Because the fiction expands the category of foreseeable plain-
tiffs to include nonpersons, a number of common law jurisdictions have
accepted an emerging tort known as "preconception negligence." In
preconception negligence, a child born with injuries will bring an action
in negligence for some event that affected one of its ancestors, sometime
before the child was ever conceived. 9 This increases the scope of civil
liability immensely. The potential for mischief was recently visited in the
Supreme Court of New York in Entright v. Eli Lilly Co.7" Extending the
unborn plaintiff approach to preconception injuries, the Court allowed an
action by a plaintiff who was the granddaughter of a person who suffered
a genetic impairment as a result of ingesting a defective pharmaceutical
product. According to the decision in Entright, the category of plaintiffs
can now be said to include not only foreseeable plaintiffs and potentially
foreseeable plaintiffs but also potential potentially foreseeable plaintiffs.
One must now foresee not only the unborn but also the unconceived. In
Entright, one must even foresee those to be conceived by the not yet
69. See J. Greenberg, "Reconceptualizing Preconception Torts" (1997) 64 Tenn. L. Rev. 315;
A. Ennecking, "The Missouri Supreme Court Recognizes Preconception Tort Liability: Lough
v. Rolla Women's Clinic" (1994) 63 UMKC L. Rev. 165; C. Stern & C.M. Gillen Tierny,
"Inheriting Workplace Risks: The Effect of Workers' Compensation 'Exclusive Remedy'
Clauses on the Preconception Tort After Johnson Controls" (1993) 28 Tort & Ins. L.J. 800;
M.M. Hershiser, "Preconception Tort Liability-The Duty to Third Generations: Entright v.
Eli Lilly & Co." (1991) 24 Creighton L. Rev. 1479; M.L. Mascaro, "Preconception Tort
Liability: Recognizing A Strict Liability Cause of Action for DES Grandchildren" (1991) 17
Am. J.L. & Med. 435; W.J. Stilling, "Entright v. Eli Lilly & Co.: Recognizing DES
Granddaughter's Preconception Strict Liability Claim" (1991) 17 J. Contemp. L. 175; D.K.
Andrews, "Recognizing A Cause of Action For Preconception Torts in Light of Medical
Advancements Regarding the Unborn" (1984) 53 UMKC L. Rev. 78; M.A. Driscoll, "A Step
Backward for the Infant in Preconception Tort Actions: Albala v. City of New York" (1982) 15
Conn. L. Rev. 161; J.E.S. Fortin, "Legal Protection for the Unborn Child" (1987) 51 Mod. L.
Rev. 54; P.B. Babin, "Preconception Negligence: Reconciling an Emerging Tort" (1979) 67
Geo. L.J. 1239; V.E. Stoll, "Preconception Tort-The Need for Limitation" (1979) 44 Mont.
L. Rev. 143; J.L. Ross, "Preconception Torts: A Look at our Newest Class of Litigants" (1978)
10 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 97; D.S. Steefel, "Preconception Torts: Foreseeing the Unconceived"
(1977) 48 U. Colo. L. Rev. 621.
70. 155 A.D.2d 64, 553 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1990).
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conceived. Although such an action has yet to commence in Canada,
inevitably it will. Whether and to what extent it will succeed, we shall
have to wait and see.
B. Family Law and the "Child in Need of Protection"
The general application of the fiction has also been ascribed to the child
en ventre sa mere in the area of family law. In 1981 the Ontario Family
Court in Kenora held that the Ontario Child Welfare ActT did not preclude
a finding that a child en ventre sa mere was "a child in need of protection"
within the meaning of the Child Welfare Act.72 Bradley J. recognized a
child en ventre sa mere as "a child in need of protection" because of the
physical abuse she suffered through her mother's excessive consumption
of alcohol and the mother's failure to obtain proper treatment. The
implication was clear that the child en ventre sa mere is protected against
abuse from its mother from the moment of conception through the full
nine months of pregnancy. This decision was affirmed in Re Children's
Aid Society of City of Belleville and T.73
These cases demonstrate that the fiction can be applied even more
aggressively than in the tort cases. In tort the fiction was employed so that
a child born with injuries could recover. In family law the fiction is now
being used to preempt injuries that have not yet occurred to a child that
is not yet born. This gives the unborn child certain powers over what a
mother can and cannot do-sometimes even before she does it. Although
these cases do not have binding authority on all Canadian courts, both
cases have been cited (neither with clear approval nor contempt) in a
discussion of foetal rights in Anglo-Canadian law in a recent Supreme
Court of Canada decision.74
C. A Progressive Movement?
A number of leading authors on the law of tort including William Prosser
have attempted to argue that these expanding uses of the fiction demon-
strate a progressive movement towards treating the child en ventre sa
71. Child Welfare Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 66, as rep'd by Child and Family Services Act, R.S.O.
1990, c. C.11.
72. Re Children's Aid Society for the District of Kenora and L.(J.) (1981), 134 D.L.R. (3d)
249 (Ont. Prov. Ct. Fam. Div.).
73. (1987), 50 O.R. (2d) 204 (Ont. Prov. Ct. Fam. Div.).
74. See Tremblay v. Daigle, supra note 19. It is important to note, however, that the Supreme
Court of Canada contrasted these cases with the approach taken by the British Columbia
Supreme Court in Re Baby R (1988), 53 D.L.R. (4th) 69, 15 R.F.L. (3d) 225, where precisely
the opposite conclusion was reached. The Court also noted that the position in England
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mere as if it were a person.75 Yet it is interesting to note the manner in
which this so-called progressive movement has come about in Canada. It
was not motivated by any particular steps taken toward statutory reform
by Parliament or the Provincial Legislatures. It was not motivated by
anything like the general sentiment of society. Nor was it even motivated
by any clearly established form of judicial precedent.76 Rather, the recent
move towards treating the unborn child as though it were a person has
come about as a result of a haphazard series of applications of a legal
fiction by a random group of judges over long stretches of time, most of
whom were trying to solve distinct legal problems. Unfortunately, the
continued use of the legal fiction has resulted in the fact that there no
longer exist any clearly established boundaries delineating the onset of
legal privileges and protections. In some areas of law the unborn are
treated as though they are persons, in other areas they are not. In many
respects, this has caused serious confusion.77
VII. The Confusion in Dobson
Such confusion is demonstrated by the reasoning adopted in Dobson
(Litigation Guardian of) v. Dobson both at the New Brunswick Court of
supports the British Columbia decision. In Re F. (in utero), [ 198812 W.L.R. 1288, the English
Court of Appeal held that a foetus did not have, at any stage of its development, a separate
existence from its mother and it was therefore held that the Court could not extend its wardship
jurisdiction to a foetus.
A similar decision was reached in Canada quite recently. In Winnipeg Child and Family
Services (Northwest Area) v. G.(D.F.) (1996), 113 Man. R. (2d) 3, 138 D.L.R. (4th) 254
[hereinafter Winnipeg Child and Family Services], the Manitoba Court of Appeal followed the
English approach taken in Re F (in utero). In so doing the Court set aside an order by Schulman
J. which would have committed an expectant mother to the custody of the Director of Child and
Family Services thereby empowering him, in effect, to dictate her medical treatment for an
addiction to sniffing solvents. Some aspects of these decisions will be further discussed below
in Part VII.
75. W.L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, 4th ed. (St. Paul: West, 1974) at 335-336.
76. In fact, a number of recent decisions both in public and private law reaffirm the common
law rule that the foetus is not a person. See e.g., R. v. Sullivan, supra note 12; Tremblay v.
Daigle, supra note 19; Medhurst v. Medhurst (1984), 46 O.R (2d) 263,9 D.L.R. (4th) 252 (Ont.
H.C.); Dehler v. Ottawa Civic Hospital, supra note 20.
77. An illustration of such confusion is found in the following passage:
There exists today a grotesque contradiction at the heart of our legal system as it
touches the unborn child. On the one hand, the unborn child enjoys the right to inherit
property; she can sue for injuries inflicted while in the womb; and she has the right to
be protected from abuse or neglect by her mother. On the other hand, she no longer
enjoys that right which is the indispensable precondition of the exercise of all her other
rights - the right not to be killed. How has this contradiction come about?
I. Gentles, "The Unborn Child in Civil and Criminal Law", in W. Cragg, ed., Contemporary
Moral Issues, 2nd. ed. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1987) at 18.
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Queen's Bench78 and, more recently, at the New Brunswick Court of
Appeal.79 Both courts relied on the legal fiction ascribing personality to
the unborn to allow Ryan Dobson to sue his own mother for pre-natal
injuries suffered as a result of her alleged negligence.
A. The New Brunswick Court of Queen's Bench
In reaching his decision, Miller J. not only acknowledged the well
established common law rule that personality begins at birth but also the
implications of that rule.
In plain terms, it would seem to logically follow that if a foetus is not a
person it does not have the rights that attach and accrue to "a person". The
foetus, not being a person, is part of its mother.
80
However, Miller J. then went on to describe the effect of applying the
legal fiction to the above rule.
The fiction recognized in the Montreal Tramways case must mean that two
persons - the mother and the foetus have the same enforceable rights.81
By fictitiously treating the foetus as though it were a person, Miller J.
seemed to think that the foetus somehow attains "the same enforceable
rights" as its mother.
But in precisely what sense are they the same rights? There is an
important ambiguity inherent in the above claim that must be sorted out.
Does Miller J. mean that the "rights" of the foetus are exactly similar to
those of its mother (i.e. that the foetus and its mother are each owed a
separate though similar duty of care by third parties)? Or does Miller J.
mean that the "rights" of the foetus and its mother are identical (i.e. that
the duty of care owed by a third party to the mother and her foetus is one
and the same)? The distinction is critical, especially in deciding whether
the fictitious ascription of personality to the unborn ought to be extended
from third party claims to claims against a child's own mother. For if the
correct sense of the phrase "the mother and the foetus have the same
enforceable rights"82 is that their "rights" are identical, this would seem
to undercut the entire basis for prenatal liability against the child's own
mother.
Throughout his judgment Miller J. suggests that the "rights" of the
foetus and its mother are one and the same.
78. Supra note 1.
79. Supra note 9.
80. Supra note 1 at 191.
81. Ibid. [emphasis added].
82. Ibid.
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I accept the defendant's argument that at the time of the commission of the
tort the plaintiff did not exist as a person and in law was part of the
defendant mother. I also accept that in tort a person cannot sue himself or
herself, even though insured. 3
However, if, stemming from their common existence, the "rights" of the
foetus are identical to those of its mother then it is not at all clear that the
Court should have extended use of the fictitious ascription of personality
to a case where the child was suing his own mother. As Miller J. rightly
pointed out, to allow such an action is, in theory, to allow an individual
to sue herself merely for insurance purposes.
What all of this reveals is that the main justification for allowing
actions in the case of pre-natal injuries caused by negligent third parties-
namely, that the mother and her unborn child are said to be in similar
positions vis-a-vis negligent third party drivers84-is not operative in the
case where it is the mother herself who is being sued for negligent driving.
In the latter situation, the mother and her unborn child are not in similar
positions vis-ai-vis the negligent driver. They are in identical positions;
according to the law, the foetus is an indistinguishable part of its mother.
Thus, given the well established principles that: (i) the unborn child is
considered to be part of its mother, and (ii) a person cannot sue herself in
tort, it must therefore follow that an unborn child-whether or not it is
fictitiously ascribed personality-cannot sue its mother in tort once born.
Why did Miller J. set up this argument, only to ignore it? For some
reason, Miller J. seemed to prefer the following argument.
But if an action can be sustained by a child against a parent, and if an action
can be sustained against a stranger for injuries suffered by a child before
birth, then it seems to me a reasonable progression to allow an action by
a child against his mother for pre-natal injuries caused by her negligence."
Though the logical structure of this argument appears to be valid, its
reasoning is in fact fallacious. The link between its premises and conclu-
sion depends on an ambiguous use of the term "child". Given the
preceding analysis of the child en ventre sa mere in the common law, it
83. Ibid. at 192.
84. Presumably, this is in essence what Prosser meant when he said that, "[a]ll writers who
have discussed the problem have joined in condemning the old rule, in maintaining that the
unborn child in the path of an automobile is as much a person in the street as the mother, and
in urging that recovery should be allowed upon proper proof', supra note 75. Interestingly,
Prosser's rhetoric in this passage illustrates once again the confusion resulting from the use of
the legal fiction. Though there may be good reason to treat the unborn child as if it were a person
in the case of a third party motorist, strictly speaking, the unborn child in the path of an
automobile is not "as much a person in the street as its mother." This point becomes especially
clear in the case where the mother is the driver of that automobile.
85. Supra note 1 at 192 [emphasis added].
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is clear that Miller J. is equivocating between two very different uses of
the term "child" in the above argument. In the first premise of the
argument Miller J. refers to a child already born; because such a child is
a legal person with a separate existence, there are no theoretical grounds
precluding him or her from commencing an action against a parent.8 6 The
second premise and the conclusion, however, refer to the unborn child.
As we have seen, the common law generally regards the unborn child as
a very different sort of entity than the child who is born alive.
To say that a court should allow post-partum actions against a child's
own mother simply because it seems a reasonable progression to treat the
unborn in the same way that we treat living children begs the question
entirely. Why is it reasonable to treat them the same? Certainly not
because the foetus is in the same position vis-a-vis its mother as, say, a
toddler or an adolescent. Quite obviously, it is not. The central difficulty
underlying almost every question concerning the unborn is precisely the
fact that an unborn child exists as a part of its mother. While this
difference between an unborn child and a newly born infant might be
thought of as minimal in the context of the duty of care owed by a third
party motorist, the difference is absolutely crucial in the context of a
woman's right to control her own body and to make fundamental
decisions about how she should live.87 Unfortunately, this latter point is
completely lost in the bare application of the legal fiction ascribing
personality to the unborn. Although Miller J. stated near the outset that
"[t]he implications of approving of unborn child-mother litigation are
manifold",88 nothing in the judgment rendered reflects these manifold
implications.
Some of the implications of allowing such litigation have been
examined quite recently by another Canadian court. In Winnipeg Child
and Family Services (NorthwestArea) v. D.F.G.89the Manitoba Court of
Appeal considered the implications of unborn child-mother litigation in
rendering its decision that the Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench lacked
the authority necessary to order a mother to undergo treatment for the
86. Though in certain instances there might be good reasons to invoke a policy that provides
an immunity for the parent against such an action. See D.E. Carroll, "Parental Liability for
Preconception Negligence: Do Parents Owe a Legal Duty to Their Potential Children?" (1986)
22 Cal. W. L. Rev. 289; R. Beal, "Can I Sue Mommy: An Analysis of a Woman's Tort Liability
for Prenatal Injuries to her Child Born Alive" (1984) 21 San Diego L. Rev. 325; D. Steefel,
"Preconception Torts: Foreseeing the Unconceived" (1978) 48 U. Colo. L. Rev. 621.
87. See R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30,44 D.L.R. (4th) 385.
88. Supra note I at 190.
89. Supra note 74.
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protection of an unborn child. Following many of the decisions discussed
above, the Court of Appeal began with the recognition that
[a]bsent a possible cause of action until the birth of the child, there is no
one at common law who may sue to restrain the mother from a course of
action potentially harmful to the child. 90
However, Twaddle J.A. acknowledged a much more serious obstacle to
allowing such a cause of action in the following lengthy but crucial
passage.
The much more serious obstacle lies in the conflict between the rights
of the mother and those of the child. If the unborn child is to be recognized
as having rights, those rights can only be protected by infringing the
mother's.
The mother's right to sniff solvents may not seem of much importance,
but I do not see how a court can select which conduct harmful to an unborn
child should be restrained and which not. That is more properly a
legislative function. Even then, as Fleming points out, "there is an aversion
against inquisition into alleged parental indiscretions during pregnancy,
like excessive smoking, drinking or taking drugs."
This aversion stems not only from respect for the mother's rights, but
also from fear of the conflict which would arise between the mother's
existing rights and those of the unborn child should they be recognized.
Such a conflict was considered to be "most undesirable" by May L.J. in Re
F (in utero)....
Although the common law permits suit by a living child against a parent
for those torts which would be clearly actionable between strangers, it has,
as Fleming observes in The Law of Torts, been reluctant to intrude unduly
into the field of family relations. Even more so is this reluctance justified,
in my opinion, where the proposed suit would pit an unborn child's rights
against those of its mother.9'
This passage illustrates-contra Miller J. in Dobson-why it is not a
"reasonable progression" to allow pre-natal actions against a child's own
mother simply because other children already alive can in certain circum-
stances commence such an action.
In conjunction with the above considerations, the Manitoba Court of
Appeal recognized other potential consequences of allowing child -
mother litigation in Winnipeg Child and Family Services. According to
Twaddle J.A., allowing such litigation will in many cases engender a
resentment between child and mother that is more harmful to the child in
the long run than whatever was done to him or her prior to birth. 92 To cause
90. Ibid. at 260.
91. Ibid. at 261 [citations omitted].
92. Ibid.
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a mother to resent her own child is indeed "most undesirable". This is
especially true in the pre-natal injury scenario, where the litigation is
usually motivated by insurance claims. Although Twaddle J.A.'s com-
ments do not apply to Dobson directly-in that the harm done to Ryan
Dobson prior to his birth far outweighs any potential resentment on the
part of his mother-it would not be altogether inaccurate to describe the
Dobson litigation as insurance-driven. With this in mind, it would be
rather unfortunate if the difficult and deeply personal questions raised by
the multi-faceted issue of child-mother litigation are ultimately resolved
on the basis of a case that is really about whose insurer ought to pay.
Besides considerations affecting the autonomy of women and the
potential strain on future family relations, the Manitoba Court of Appeal
also contemplated the effect on the public interest if such litigation were
allowed. Twaddle J.A. recognized that, by allowing such litigation,
we may induce other expectant mothers, fearing state intervention in their
conduct, to avoid detection by not seeking desirable pre-natal care. There
is a public interest in having expectant mothers receive proper pre-natal
care. This public interest militates against recognition of foetal rights.93
This passage reflects the public interest in protecting the well-being of
pregnant women. Given that interest, we need to consider much more
carefully the numerous unforeseen effects of child-mother litigation
before allowing such actions.
Regardless of whether one is ultimately persuaded by the unanimous
view of Manitoba Court of Appeal that these sorts of considerations
outweigh our interest in protecting the unborn, what is important to
recognize presently is that, in Dobson, Miller J. has allowed a very similar
cause of action without making any such considerations. On the basis of
an extremely superficial and fallacious argument, Miller J. has extended
the scope of recovery for pre-natal injuries in a manner that is both
unprecedented and insupportable at the level of theory.
B . The New Brunswick Court of Appeal
The New Brunswick Court of Appeal affirmed the reasoning adopted by
Miller J. at the Court of Queen's Bench, dismissed Cynthia Dobson's
appeal and awarded costs to the respondent litigation guardian.94 Relying
uncritically on the precedent set in Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, 95
Hoyt C.J.N.B. endorsed Miller J.' s "reasonable progression" argument.96
93. Ibid.
94. Supra note 9.
95. Supra note 6.
96. See the discussion above at note 85.
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What is perhaps even more remarkable about the decision is the expedi-
tious manner in which it was released. Despite the controversy surround-
ing its potential implications and despite the fact that an important case
cited within the decision was about to be heard at the Supreme Court of
Canada,97 judgment was reserved for only twelve days and resulted in a
written decision which occupied a mere five and one half pages. In those
few pages the Court was adamant in its opinion that the appeal raises a
very narrow issue that is not subject to social policy considerations. In
fact, that very point was reiterated in three of the twelve paragraphs that
make up the reasons for judgment.
The Court of Appeal made no attempt to grapple with the unique
theoretical problems arising from the fact that Ryan Dobson was attempt-
ing to sue his own mother rather than some third party. This gap in the
reasons for judgment is curious, especially given the Court's recognition
that Ryan Dobson "did not exist as a person and in law was part of the
defendant mother."98 In response to the appellant's submission that the
plaintiff lacked the legal status necessary to commence an action, Hoyt
C.J.N.B. stated that the
submission fails because of the very real distinction between an action
brought by or on behalf of a foetus and one brought on or behalf of a child.
The law seems settled that a foetus has no right to sue or be the subject of
an action. See, for example, Tremblay v. Daigle, Sullivan, In Re F (in
utero) ... and Winnipeg Child and Family Services (which is under appeal
to the Supreme Court of Canada). These cases, however, do not have
application where, as here, it is not a foetus but a child who is bringing the
action .99
There is a very real distinction between an action brought by or on behalf
of a foetus and one brought by or on behalf of a child. The obvious
rationale underlying this distinction is the common law rule that person-
ality begins at birth. What is not so obvious is why the New Brunswick
Court of Appeal was willing to recognize the very real distinction in its
determination of who can be a plaintiff, but was unwilling to recognize
the very same distinction its determination of who can be a foreseeable
plaintiff. There was simply no discussion of the matter.
The Court then went on to reject the appellant's submission that there
are sound policy reasons against allowing a child to sue his own mother
for pre-natal injuries occasioned by his mother's actions.
97. Winnipeg Child and Family Services (Northwest Area) v. D.F.G., [1996] S.C.C.A. No.
424 (QL) (Court File No. 25508) (S.C.C.). Oral submissions were heard on June 18, 1997 and
judgment was reserved.
98. Supra note 9 at para. 3.
99. Ibid. at para. 8 [emphasis added].
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Nor am I attracted to the appellant's submission that there are social policy
reasons for rejecting this claim. Mrs. Dobson raises the spectre of mothers
being sued by their children for various activities or lifestyle choices such
as smoking, drinking and the taking or refusal of medication, during
pregnancy that injure the child, with the result that mothers will be unable
to control their own bodies and make autonomous choices. Cases alleging
negligent conduct of such a nature by a mother during pregnancy may well
involve difficult policy decisions, but they do not arise here. As noted, the
narrow issue here concerns pre-natal injuries received by a child as a result
of a mother's negligent driving of her motor vehicle and not injuries
occasioned as a result of a mother's lifestyle choices."°
The basis for rejecting the social policy argument in this case, according
to Hoyt C.J.N.B., is to be found in the distinction between a woman's
choice to drive while pregnant, and other sorts of lifestyle choices she
might make that are more "peculiar to parenthood." 10' According to the
Court, the duty owed by the defendant mother to her unborn child in this
case is derived from the general duty that she owes to the public to drive
carefully. It therefore cannot be characterized as a duty that is "peculiar
to parenthood." Consequently, any concern that a finding of liability in
this case will set a precedent allowing mothers to be sued by their children
for making various "peculiar" lifestyle choices is said to be unwarranted.
Is this argument persuasive? Or does it beg the question in exactly the
same way that Miller J. did? As the following passage illustrates, its
ultimate success depends on the premise that duties owed by a pregnant
woman to the general public are owed to her unborn child as well.
A pregnant mother has a general duty to drive carefully, a duty she owes
to her children as well as to the general public. If, as it is alleged here, the
child suffers injury during his or her lifetime as a result of the mother's
negligent driving during pregnancy, there is no reason that the child should
not be able to enforce his or her rights. To hold otherwise would create a
partial exclusion to a pregnant mother's general duty to drive carefully. 2
Would denying a child the right to commence an action under these
circumstances really create a partial exclusion to a pregnant mother's
general duty to drive carefully? The answer to this question is yes only if
one already considers the unborn to be part of the general public. Of
course, an unborn child is not in law considered to be part of the general
public-not without implicitly employing the legal fiction that treats the
100. Ibid. at para. 9.
101. E.g. smoking, drinking or taking drugs. Hoyt C.J.N.B. cites an Australian case and an
English statute in support of this distinction, ibid. at para. 10: Lynch v. Lynch (By Her Tutor
Lynch) (1991) 25 N.S.W.L.R. 411; Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976 (UK),
1976, c. 28.
102. Supra note 9 at para. 11.
270 The Dalhousie Law Journal
unborn child as though already born. Since an unborn child is not in law
a person, it is not part of the general public. According to a well
established common law rule, the unborn child is part of its mother.
Although there is undeniable precedent that an unborn child has the same
enforceable right as its mother against a negligent third party motorist, it
is quite another thing to say that the unborn child can enforce that right-
a right which is in law dependant upon the mother's own right to sue-
against the mother herself. Since the child is in law a part of its mother and
not part of the general public, refusing to allow a child to sue its own
mother for driving negligently would not create a partial exclusion to a
pregnant mother's duty to the general public to drive carefully.
In addition to begging the question about the legal status of the unborn,
the reasoning adopted by the Court of Appeal is subject to an additional
problem. According to Hoyt C.J.N.B., the Court of Appeal was attempt-
ing to narrow the issue in Dobson by distinguishing between activities
where there is a general duty to avoid injury to the public (e.g. driving
while pregnant) and activities where the duty is peculiar to parenthood
(e.g. smoking while pregnant). Does this distinction truly narrow this
issue in a manner that will preserve a woman's ability to control her own
body and make autonomous choices, thereby rendering social policy
considerations unnecessary? The New Brunswick Court of Appeal
seemed to think so, citing Fleming's claim that:
there is a strong aversion against inquisition into alleged parental indiscre-
tions during pregnancy, like excessive smoking, drinking ortaking drugs.103
Perhaps this is the case in Australia, but it is by no means clear that the
same holds true in Canada and the United States. 104In any event,
employing the distinction between duties owed to the general public and
those peculiar to parenthood does not assist the Court in narrowing the
issue in Dobson. In fact, it has the very opposite effect. The rule that the
103. Ibid. at para. 10.
104. Considering the original order of Schulman J. in Winnipeg Child and Family Services,
supra note 74 and the fact that the Supreme Court of Canada has granted leave to reconsider
that order, supra note 97, it is not clear that there is a strong aversion to such inquisitions in
Canada. In any event, there is no guarantee that activities such as smoking during pregnancy
will be remain immune to litigation, especially if the reasoning adopted above is applied.
It appears as though activities such as smoking are moving more and more from the
private to the public realm, especially as the effects of secondhand smoke on children become
better known. Canadian Courts have already held that the effects of secondhand smoke are a
relevant factor in a determination of "the best interests of the child" in custody and access
disputes: Bourdon v. Casselman (1988), 12 R.F.L. (3d) 395 (Ont. Prov. Ct. Fam. Div.); Watt
v. Watt, [1995] Y.J. No. 95 (QL) (Y.C.A.). In other jurisdictions the Courts have gone a step
further by issuing protective orders that prescribe when and where a parent may smoke: Unger
v. Unger 644 A.2d 691 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Ch. Div. 1994).
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Court of Appeal has derived from Fleming's distinction is that duties
owed by a pregnant woman to the general public are owed to her unborn
child as well. The consequence of this rule, which seems to have gone
completely unnoticed by the Court, is that it will allow a child's litigation
guardian to commence actions for pre-natal injuries resulting from
innumerable sorts of lifestyle choices that a pregnant woman might
embrace. These would include activities such as rollerblading, shopping
in a crowded mall, spraying weedkiller on her crops, sailing, lighting
fireworks for her children on Canada day, or any other activity where
there is a risk of harm to the general public. There is nothing unique or
narrow about the act of driving a car. It is just as much a lifestyle choice
as any of the other activitiesjust mentioned. Thus the Court of Appeal was
incorrect in stating that
the narrow issue here concerns pre-natal injuries received by a child as a
result of a mother's negligent driving of her motor vehicle and not injuries
occasioned as a result of a mother's lifestyle choices.0'0
Ironically, in its attempt to shield women from inquisitions into alleged
parental indiscretions such as smoking and drinking, the Court of Appeal
has expanded the liability of pregnant women. Despite the Court's
Smoking claims have in some jurisdictions made inroads into the law of tort as well. U.S.
employers must now consider the possibility of negligence actions for allowing smoke in the
workplace: see M. Moorby, "Smoking Parents, Their Children, And The Home: Do The Courts
Have The Authority To Clear The Air?" (1995) 12 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 827; Action on Smoking
and Health (ASH), ASH Smoking and Health Review, Special Report, "Involuntary Smoking:
A Factual Basis for Action at 9" (July-Aug 1992). Smokers have also been found liable for
battery in at least two U.S. Appellate Courts: Leichtman v. W.L. W. Jacor Communications,
Inc., OhioCt. App., No. C-920922, Hamilton County; Richardson v. Hennly, Ga. Ct. App. Nos.
A93A0680. A93A0807. In Richardson the plaintiff had been hospitalized twice for allergic
and respiratory illness due to exposure to a pipe smoker who worked 30 feet way from her.
Although her employer purchased air cleaners for her, it was held that its failure to stop her co-
worker from smoking gave rise to an action in battery. According to the Court, "We are not
prepared to accept the argument that pipe smoke is a substance so immaterial that it is incapable
of being used to batter indirectly."
Given these recent trends, it may not be long before some form of public smoking gives rise
to a tort action in Canada. According to the reasoning adopted by the New Brunswick Court
of Appeal above, if a pregnant woman owes a general duty to the public to refrain from smoking
in certain places, she must owe that duty to her children as well. If her child suffers an injury
during his lifetime as a result of her failure to refrain from smoking during pregnancy, there is
no reason why the child should not be able to enforce his or her rights. To hold otherwise would
create a partial exclusion to the pregnant woman's general duty to refrain from smoking in
certain places. Therefore, according to the Court's own reasoning, in the near future, a child
born with pre-natal injuries may be able to commence an action against his or her mother for
failing to refrain from smoking during her pregnancy.
I am indebted to Daniel Debow for the above argument and for supplying me with the
supporting case law.
105. Supra note 100.
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intention to narrow the scope of liability to negligent driving, 10 6 its failure
to acheive that intention will ultimately do more to harm to the autonomy
of pregnant women than good. While fictitiously treating the foetus as a
member of the general public might be justified as against a third party,
surely different considerations apply as against its own mother. This
point has been recognized by some judges in other jurisdictions:
Holding a third party liable for negligently inflicting prenatal injuries
furthers the child's right to begin life free of injuries caused by the
negligence of others, but does not significantly restrict the behaviour or
actions of the defendant beyond the limitations already imposed by the
duty owed to the world at a large by long standing rules of tort law. Third
parties, despite this recently imposed duty to the fetus, are able to continue
to act much as they did before the cause of action was recognized.
Imposing the same duty on the mother, however, will constrain her
behaviour and affirmatively mandate acts which have traditionally rested
solely in the province of the individual free from judicial scrutiny, guided,
until now, by the mother's sense of personal responsibility and moral, not
legal, obligation to her fetus.
Although it is true that the law may impose liability based on the special
relationship between certain parties, we can think of no existing legal duty
analogous to this one, which could govern the details of a woman's life as
her diet, sleep, exercise, sexual activity, work and living environment, and,
of course, nearly every aspect of her health care. Imposing a legal duty
upon a mother to her fetus creates a legal relationship which is irrefutably
unique. "No other plaintiff depends exclusively on any other defendant for
everything necessary for life itself. . . As opposed to the third-party
defendant, it is the mother's every waking and sleeping moment which, for
better or worse, shapes the prenatal environment which forms the world for
the developing fetus. That this is so is not a pregnant woman's fault: it is
a fact of life." Stallman v. Youngquist 125 Ill.2d 267, 278-79, 531 N.E.2d
355, 360 (1988).107
Deciding whether a child can sue his own mother for pre-natal injuries
caused by her negligent driving is not a narrow issue. This much was
acknowledged by Miller J. in the original motion that gave rise to this
appeal. According to Miller J., "[t]his is a question with obvious expand-
ing implications and is one which must ultimately be determined by a
higher court of the judicial structure."''0 Ironically, the New Brunswick
Court of Appeal affirmed every aspect of Miller J.'s decision except for
this one. Instead of seizing the opportunity to confront the obvious
expanding implications that are sure to result from this decision, the Court
106. A decision no doubt inspired by insurance considerations.
107. Brock C.J. and Batchelder J (dissenting) in Bonte v. Bonte (1992), 136 N.H. 286. This
case was mentioned by Hoyt C.J.N.B., ibid. at para. 10.
108. Supra note 8.
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of Appeal has chosen instead to adopt the unsound reasoning of the lower
court.
Conclusion
In principle, I have no quarrel with those who believe that our law ought
to offer a restricted range of protection to the unborn including, in certain
limited circumstances, a cause of action for pre-natal injuries. All that I
have tried to demonstrate is that the usual justification for employing the
fiction that treats the child en ventre sa mre as though born is stretched
beyond its theoretical limits in the case of pre-natal injuries-especially
where a child born with injuries is attempting to recover against his or her
own mother. By demonstrating that the reasoning adopted in both
Dobson decisions is insupportable, I hope to have cleared the ground for
a deeper analysis of the non-theoretical issues that must be addressed in
a proper determination of the scope of recovery for pre-natal injuries.
Lon Fuller once remarked on the motives that give rise to legal fictions
by saying that
it is possible that the fiction may proceed from purely intellectual consid-
erations. The judge ... was not thinking of fooling others, nor was he
carried away by an emotional desire to preserve the existing doctrine....
He was simply seeking a solution for a case which was intellectually
satisfying to himself. And that solution turned out to involve a forcing of
the case into existing categories, instead of the creation of new ones."°
Decisions such as the one in Thellusson v. Woodford,' 10where the use of
a legal fiction in an isolated case was not subject to competing consider-
ations, may indeed have provided a solution which was, at the time,
intellectually satisfying. However, the current theory of liability for
prenatal injuries-whether the legal fiction is used explicitly or implic-
itly-is not intellectually satisfying. As I have demonstrated, the intellec-
tual considerations motivating the early use of the fiction are no longer
applicable.
When the conditions of modern life no longer fit within existing legal
categories, the creation of new ones becomes imperative. Whether such
reform is ultimately delivered via statute or judicial pronouncement,
there is an immediate need to stop using old judicial artifices and to start
thinking long and hard about how best to treat the unborn in a manner that
is consistent with the protection of the autonomy of women. Though such
a project certainly begins with a recognition of the intellectual shortcom-
109. Supra note 13 at 68.
110. Supra note 26.
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ings of the present theory of liability based on its use of a legal fiction, it
must inevitably include a substantive analysis of the nature and extent of
a woman's right to make autonomous choices. Unfortunately, such
considerations have been completely side-stepped by the reasoning
adopted in both of the Dobson decisions.
